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Consensus protocols are used for the distributed management of large 
databases in an environment without trust among participants. The choice 
of a specific protocol depends on the purpose and characteristics of the 
system itself. The subjects of the paper are consensus protocols in permis-
sioned blockchains. The objective of this paper is to identify functional 
advantages and disadvantages of observed protocol. The analysis covers 
a total of six consensus protocols for permissioned blockchains. The 
following characteristics were compared: security, trust among partici-
pants, throughput and scalability. The results show that no protocol shows 
absolute dominance in all aspects of the comparison. Paxos and Raft are 
intended for systems in which there is no suspicion of unreliable users, 
but only the problem of a temporary shutdown. Practical Byzantine Fault 
Tolerance is intended for systems with a small number of nodes. Federat-
ed Byzantine Fault Tolerance shows better scalability and is more suitable 
for large systems, but can withstand a smaller number of malicious nodes. 
Proof-of-authority can withstand the largest number of malicious nodes 
without interfering with the functioning of the system. When choosing 
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1. Introduction
Blockchain technology enables distributed manage-
ment of large databases. Its functioning was explained 
for the first time in the Bitcoin cryptocurrency manifesto, 
in late 2008 [1]. Given its characteristics, blockchain soon 
came out of the shadow of cryptocurrencies and found ap-
plication in the broader electronic business context. This 
technology allows participants to execute transactions in 
order to enter new data in the public ledger. A transaction 
is any instruction that leads to a change in the state of the 
system. The public ledger consists of a series of blocks, 
which contain records of performed transactions [2]. The 
content of each block depends on the content of the pre-
viously entered blocks, because the new state depends on 
the previous state and the changes brought by the transac-
tions. Data is entered into the public ledger without third 
party mediation [3]. As there is no trust among participants, 
it is necessary to provide a mechanism by which the en-
tered data will be checked and confirmed. This mecha-
nism is called a consensus protocol.
Blockchain technology itself is new, but its foundations 
are previously known technologies and methods, such 
as asymmetric cryptography, timestamping, Merkle tree, 
hash functions and smart contracts. Asymmetric cryptog-
raphy is used to sign executed transactions. Transactions 
are timestamped to avoid double spending by creating 
confusion about the order. Hash functions are used to 
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prevent subsequent changes to the contents of blocks em-
bedded in the public ledger. Therefore, the hash value of 
the previous block is entered in each new block, which 
prevents the change of their content [4]. Blockchain tech-
nology enables the implementation of smart contracts, as 
an electronic document that is executed on the basis of a 
programming code [5]. Consensus algorithms themselves 
are not a new technological solution. Their foundations 
were laid by Lamport (1978) and Schneider (1990) in the 
desire to formulate algorithms tolerant to a certain kind of 
faults [6] [7].
The subjects of the paper are consensus protocols in 
permissioned blockchains. The objective of this paper is 
to identify the functional advantages and disadvantages of 
observed protocols. The paper will be divided into three 
sections. The section one will present the key features of 
blockchain technology. Special attention will be addressed 
to the difference of the blockchain systems according to 
the degree of openness for participants. The section two 
analyzes the principles of functioning of the observed pro-
tocols individually. The final section identifies advantages 
and disadvantages of all protocols through a comparative 
analysis of their key characteristics.
2. Blockchain Characteristics
There are three types of participants in blockchain 
systems: nodes, full nodes, and miners. Nodes are par-
ticipants that can send or receive transactions, but do not 
participate in consensus building nor keep a copy of the 
public ledger. In addition to participating in transactions, 
full nodes also store a copy of the public ledger. Miners 
are full nodes that participate in consensus building and 
embed new blocks in the public ledger. Generally, partic-
ipants do not know each other and do not trust each other. 
This means that each blockchain must have a built-in 
protocol for reaching consensus in trustless environment 
where there is no third party to confirm data authenticity 
[8]. The protocol determines which participants can create 
blocks, how consensus is reached and whether there is a 
reward.
When performing a transaction, the sender applies the 
selected hash function to it and signs the resulting record 
using a private key. The signature authenticates the send-
er. Miners need to confirm the integrity of the transaction 
and the participant who sent it. This means that the digital 
signature should correspond to the sender’s signature, i.e. 
hash value of the transaction should correspond to the one 
signed by the user. After confirmation, one of the miners 
(depending on the algorithm) packs the transactions into a 
block and suggests a new block to the other miners [9]. The 
new block contains the hash value of the previous block, 
the timestamp, and a list of included transactions. Other 
miners check whether the size of the block is within the 
allowed values, whether it follows the previous block ac-
cording to the timestamp, as well as all hash values. 
Sharing a public ledger of transactions among partic-
ipants and signing transactions creates the conditions for 
overcoming the problem of mistrust. After reaching a con-
sensus, the block is embedded in the public ledger, which 
is available to everyone and shows the current state of 
the system. This eliminates the need for an intermediary 
in transmitting and storing data [10]. Once recorded in the 
public ledger, transactions are irreversible. Merkle tree 
technology is used to connect blocks, so any attempt to 
change the content of a previously performed transaction 
leads to a change in the content of all subsequent blocks. 
Attempting to systemically change a series of blocks 
would require enormous computing power regardless of 
consensus protocol, an investment that can hardly be justi-
fied by benefits. 
According to their openness to participants, blockchain 
systems are divided into permissioned blockchains and 
permissionless blockchains. They differ fundamentally 
in terms of access to the system and the role that the user 
can perform. Permissionless blockchains have open ac-
cess. Each user can become part of the network and act 
as a node, full node or miner, as all roles are available [11]. 
Because of these characteristics, these blockchain systems 
are often referred to as public.
In permissioned blockchains, there is a clear separation 
of roles. Miners are always known and predetermined [12]. 
There are differences in terms of the capabilities that other 
users may have. For some systems, membership is open, 
but nodes can only send and receive transactions. For oth-
ers, each user must receive a special invitation to become 
a node. In such systems, all users are known and identi-
fied in advance. Due to these characteristics, such systems 
are referred to as private or consortium blockchains in the 
literature. However, it should be borne in mind that higher 
centralization compared to permissionless blockchains 
should not mean that one institution is the full owner of 
the system. For any business application in which there is 
a trusted institution, it is better to use some other database 
technology than blockchain.
3. Types of Consensus Protocols in Permis-
sioned Blockchains
3.1 Byzantine Fault Tolerant Protocols
Most of the protocols for reaching consensus in per-
missioned blockchain systems are based on solving the 
problems of Byzantine generals. The problem describes 
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difficulties in reaching an agreement in conditions of mu-
tual distrust among decision makers [13]. One can imagine 
that several divisions of Byzantine army attack the enemy 
city. A unilateral attack of a single division cannot lead to 
victory. But if the generals reach a consensus on the tim-
ing of the simultaneous attack, the city will be conquered. 
The problem is that generals cannot communicate directly, 
but solely through couriers. There may be two problems.
The first problem is the possibility that some of the 
generals are traitors and deliberately send contradictory 
messages. Another problem is the possibility for some of 
the couriers to change the content of the messages, either 
because they are traitors, or because the enemy intercepts 
them and replaces them with their own couriers. There-
fore, it is necessary to devise a mechanism for reaching 
consensus, so that: 
a. All loyal generals adopt the same plan (traitors, if 
any, can do what they want).
b. Traitors cannot lead loyal generals into adopting a 
wrong plan.
The problem that participants in permissioned block-
chains face is similar to the problem of Byzantine gener-
als. There are a finite number of known participants, but 
it is not possible to say with certainty which of them are 
loyal and which are traitors. Therefore, consensus algo-
rithm must be able to allow decision-making even when 
some participants are unreliable. In addition to this type, 
crash faults also occur, when, due to technical, or prob-
lems of some other nature, the decision-making process is 
slowed down or stopped. Therefore, consensus algorithms 
in permissioned blockchains are divided into crash fault 
tolerant and Byzantine fault tolerant.
3.1.1 Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Practical Byzantine fault tolerances was formulated by 
Castro & Liskov (2002) [14]. The algorithm is designed to 
work in asynchronous systems and to provide liveness and 
safety. Liveness is reflected in the fact that some consen-
sus will certainly be reached. Safety refers to the ability to 
reach a valid consensus in a situation where at most (n-1)/3 
nodes act maliciously, with n being the total number of 
nodes participating in the decision-making. If we denote 
the faulty nodes with f, then the total number of nodes 
must be n = 3f +1. 
To prevent misrepresentation and confusion, each 
node signs messages with its own secret key. Also, each 
message has an authentication code, and when sent, it 
is compressed using the hash function. Each node com-
municates with all other nodes in the system. Nodes can 
identify each other based on the signature and check if 
the message was changed during transmission. Before 
the consensus-building process begins, the nodes are di-
vided hierarchically, with one chosen as the leader and 
the others as the backup. The role of the nodes changes 
before each new round of decision-making on a round 
robin basis. One round of consensus-building consists of 
four phases. In the first phase, the client sends a message 
to the leader wanting to change the state of the system. In 
the second phase, the leader forwards the message to the 
backup nodes. Backup nodes consider the content of the 
message and send a response in the third phase. In the last 
phase, the client collects f +1 identical responses from the 
backup. The selected response represents the attitude of 
the entire system towards the message sent by the client.
The key advantage of pBFT in relation to all permis-
sionless blockchains protocols is lower computational 
complexity, and, thus, lower electricity consumption. 
Also, the throughput is higher than with the mentioned 
systems. However, pBFT is intended for systems with a 
small number of participants. Increasing the number of 
nodes exponentially increases the volume of communica-
tion, so application in permissionless blockchains would 
lead to congestion. Of the known blockchain platforms, 
Hyperledger Fabric and Zilliqa use pBFT.
3.1.2 Delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Delegated Byzantine fault tolerance (dBFT) is a mod-
ification of the basic form of pBFT (Coelho et al., 2020) 
[15]. It was proposed during the creation of the NEO block-
chain, which, in addition to the cryptocurrency of the 
same name, offers a code for creating smart contracts. The 
GAS token is used to execute smart contracts, which users 
who own NEO cryptocurrency receive as a kind of divi-
dend.
The use of dBFT overcomes the problem of exces-
sive communication due to the increase in the number of 
nodes. Any user who owns a NEO can vote for one of the 
nodes, which then become delegates. In order for a node 
to become a delegate, it is necessary to positively identify 
itself, to have a stable internet connection and appropriate 
computer equipment, and to invest 1000 GAS units [16]. 
The speaker is then randomly selected from among the 
delegates. The speaker selects the transactions to be in-
cluded in the new block and sends the proposal to the del-
egates for confirmation. The block needs to be confirmed 
by at least 2/3 of the delegates. Otherwise the proposal is 
rejected and a new random speaker is elected who repeats 
the process.
The dBFT protocol is criticized for the increased level 
of centralization. Although in theory this should not be 
the case, the NEO cryptocurrency has shown that all del-
egates are also members of the founding consortium. It 
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can be assumed that this was not the idea of the founders, 
but it should also be borne in mind that the selection of 
delegates is a great challenge. On the one hand, if no are 
set, participants can delegate themselves. On the other 
hand, setting criteria too high reduces the number of del-
egates and the system becomes centralized. In that case, 
the blockchain does not fulfill its basic decentralization 
premise among users who do not trust each other.
3.1.3 Federated Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Federated Byzantine fault tolerance or the Federated 
Byzantine Agreement (FBA) is also a modification of the 
basic form of pBFT. In order to overcome the problem 
of extensive communication, the FBA implies that nodes 
exchange messages only with nodes they trust [17]. The 
Stellar and Ripple cryptocurrencies use the FBA variants. 
A set of nodes that one node trusts is called a quorum 
slice, while a quorum is a set of nodes that trust each oth-
er. Based on the mutual trust with other nodes, one node 
can be part of multiple quorums at the same time. That 
node represents the quorum intersection. Nodes commu-
nicate only within the quorum. Each node collects trans-
actions performed after the last block was embedded and 
those performed before which so far have not become part 
of the blocks. The nodes then declare on the validity of 
the proposed transactions. When they receive the required 
percentage of positive votes, the transactions are included 
in the block, which is embedded into the public ledger.
In the Ripple protocol, a quorum is a unique node list 
(UNL). Making a decision implies a positive response 
from at least 80% of the nodes involved. This means that 
the maximum number of malicious nodes can be f ≤ (n - 
1) / 5, where n is the number of nodes within a particular 
UNL. This leads to a strong correctness of the system. In 
case the number of malicious nodes is higher, the system 
has a defense plan. As long as their number is f ≤ (4n + 
1) / 5, the system exhibits weak correctness, i.e. it is not 
capable of validating true transactions, but can prevent 
malicious nodes from embedding fake transactions [18]. 
Unlike the previous two protocols, which ensured finality 
without the possibility of forking, in FBA, the possibility 
of forking depends on the size of the quorum. If the size 
of individual quorums does not have a lower limit, then 
forking is possible. However, even with the lower limit of 
0.2 * ntotal, where ntotal is the total number of nodes in the 
system, forking becomes impossible if the quorums par-
tially overlap. 
3.1.4 Proof-of-authority
Proof-of-authority (PoA) is a consensus protocol based 
on the identification of nodes and their reputation. It was 
created in 2015 based on the proof-of-stake (PoS), with 
the proviso that in this case the nodes do not invest the 
coins they own, but their own reputation [9]. Nodes that 
embed blocks in the public ledger are called validators. In 
order to become a validator, node’s identity must not only 
be publicly known, but also confirmed by the notary ser-
vice. The point of the system is that in case of any unde-
sirable behavior, the validator gains a negative reputation 
and loses the opportunity to participate in further block 
creation. Nodes with a satisfactory reputation change in 
the role of validator on a round robin basis.
Although PoA can also be used in permissionless 
blockchains, its design is extremely centralistic, because 
a small group of validators embed blocks. Also, PoA does 
not ensure anonymity, as one of the key features of a per-
missionless blockchain. The advantage is that, unlike PoS, 
it does not favor rich individuals. In practice, PoA is used 
on the PoA Network and Vechain trading platforms, as 
well as on the Quorum blockchain platform.
3.2 Crash Fault Tolerant Protocols
The second class of consensus protocols deals with the 
problems of the imperfect environment in which systems 
operate. A metaphorical representation of the problems ad-
dressed by these protocols is the fictitious local assembly 
on the Greek island of Paxos. Deputies constantly enter 
the assembly hall and leave, while staying in the building 
for a period of time that is not foreseen in advance, nor 
is it the same for each deputy. Despite the occasional ab-
sence of deputies, it is necessary to provide conditions for 
unhindered legislative decisions. Thus, crash fault tolerant 
protocols ensure functioning in situations where individ-
ual participants are unavailable during a certain period. 
The assumption is that there are no participants who are 
malicious, i.e. that Byzantine faults are not a problem that 
the system encounters.
3.2.1 Paxos
Paxos is not an individual protocol, but a whole family 
of protocols, created with the aim of solving the problem 
of absence of participants [19]. The basic system assump-
tions are as follows: processors perform operations at any 
arbitrary speed; during work they may experience a crash 
fault; after recovery, processors can rejoin the protocol; 
during operation, processors do not attempt to trick the 
system in any way. In terms of communication, one pro-
cessor can send messages to any other processor, which 
takes an arbitrarily long time to be delivered. Messages 
can be lost, but they are not modified by third parties. 
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Consensus can be reached when the total number of nodes 
is n = 2F + 1, where F is the maximum number of nodes 
that can experience a simultaneous crash fault. In other 
words, most of the total number of nodes must always be 
present.
Nodes are called acceptors in Paxos protocols. They 
are divided into quorums, as subsets of a set of acceptors, 
with any two quorums having to be intersected by at least 
one acceptor [20]. The size of the quorum is such that it in-
cludes the majority of the total number of acceptors (and 
in the event that the acceptors are assigned a certain vot-
ing weight, the quorum must include more than half of the 
votes). The client sends a message requesting a change of 
state from the system. In order for a decision to be made, 
all quorum acceptors must receive the same message. The 
proposer coordinates the distribution of messages and de-
cision-making (especially in case of disagreement). Each 
system has one prominent proposer, called a leader. Final-
ly, learners execute the decisions made (change the state 
of the system) and send a response to the client.
When a proposer receives a request from a client, they 
formulate a message, assign it a certain number p, and dis-
tribute it to the acceptors within the quorum. The number 
p serves only to determine the chronological order of the 
message and must be greater than the numbers of all mes-
sages that the acceptors have processed so far. This activi-
ty is called Prepare. Upon receipt, the acceptors check the 
number p and if that number is greater than the numbers 
of all previous messages, they send a positive response. 
This process is called Promise. If they have accepted a 
message in the previous period, they shall also submit to 
the proposer the number of that message q (where q < p) 
and the value of w accepted by that message. Since Paxos 
is intended for asynchronous systems, participants may be 
at different stages of the process, so it is possible that the 
proposer does not know that the message q is accepted at 
all. In case the number of the message p is less than the 
number of any of the previous messages, the acceptors can 
send a negative response to the proposer, or not respond at 
all. This concludes the first phase.
If it receives a sufficient number of positive responses, 
the proposer in the second phase submits to the acceptors 
the full content of the message p, which, in addition to the 
number, also contains the proposed value v = x. In case 
the acceptors inform them that the message q has been ac-
cepted in the meantime, the proposer can decide to modify 
the proposal before sending, and for the proposed value to 
be v = y. A request for verification and acceptance is sent 
to the acceptors with the message. Acceptors accept the 
message (p, v) if in the meantime they have not promised 
to consider only the message under the number r, r > p. [21]. 
When they accept the message, they inform the proposer 
and the learners (although the role of the learner is often 
played by the proposer itself).
This case is a general form of the Paxos algorithm. As 
it is a family of protocols, this means that the general case 
has a large number of modifications into specific forms. 
Individual cases vary significantly in terms of purpose, 
and, therefore, have different performance, which further 
complicates the comparison of this protocol with other 
ones.
3.2.2 Raft
Raft is a consensus protocol with resilience to crash 
faults, proposed by Ongaro & Ousterhout (2014) [22]. It is 
a modification of the Paxos algorithm, in which nodes can 
exist in one of three states: leader, followers or candidates. 
Time is divided into arbitrarily long sections, called terms. 
During one term, the same node always plays the role of 
the leader. They receive requests for transactions from 
clients, check them and index them, in order to maintain 
insight into chronological order. The transactions are then 
packed in blocks, which are forwarded to followers. The 
task of the followers is to send the leader an acknowledg-
ment of the correctness of the block and to replicate the 
block, i.e. to take over the information it contains.
When requests for new entries stop arriving, the node 
waits for a certain period, known as an election timeout. 
This means that the old leader has lost its role and that 
elections for a leader for the next term are taking place. 
The node becomes a candidate, gives itself a vote and 
sends messages to the rest of the network asking for sup-
port for its candidacy. If it gets the support of most other 
nodes, it will be elected leader in the coming term. It then 
sends a message to all other nodes informing them of its 
election. Also, it can happen that, while waiting for votes, 
the node receives a message from another node claiming 
to have been elected leader. In that case, the node com-
pares its term index with the term index of the node that 
claims to be elected. If its term index is lower, it must 
recognize the other node as the leader. However, if its 
term index is higher, it can reject the message of the node 
claiming to be the leader and continue to collect votes. A 
higher term index value indicates that this node is aware 
of the last changes that have occurred. If no candidate 
collects enough votes, the whole process is repeated with 
a randomly assigned short pause. The node assigned the 
shortest pause will initiate a new vote.
The key difference between Paxos and Raft algorithms 
is that Raft allows only the best updated nodes to take 
on the role of the leader, while with the Paxos algorithm 
it can be any node [23]. The well-known blockchain plat-
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forms, R3 Corda and Quorum, use Raft as a consensus 
protocol.
4. Comparing Protocols
Permissionless blockchains are easy to compare. They 
all have the same purpose, but show significant differ-
ences in terms of required investments, throughput and 
scalability. In addition, a large number of papers com-
pare these protocols in some respect. The situation with 
permissioned blockchains is somewhat more complex. 
First of all, the systems are divided into two large groups, 
which differ according to the level of security they pro-
vide. Differences in purpose undoubtedly lead to differ-
ences in performance. However, the problem that exists 
in the literature is the uneven terminology in this area. 
Some papers that generally compare consensus protocols 
for permissioned blockchains actually compare the perfor-
mance of the platforms applying them [24].
Since none of the observed protocols are based on 
intensive computation, no high initial investment is nec-
essary. Protocols are not competitive as proof-of-work 
and related protocols are, so there is no energy load. They 
still differ a lot in scalability and throughput. Also, there 
is a significant difference in terms of mutual trust between 
nodes. Having in mind the representative research in this 
field, the comparison was made on the basis of the follow-
ing characteristics: security, mutual trust, throughput and 
scalability. Table 1 presents the results of the comparison. 
Table 1. Comparative analysis of the presented consensus 
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Source: author, according to the broad literature
The first four presented protocols protect the system 
from Byzantine faults. They differ from each other in the 
proportion of malicious nodes that the system can tolerate 
without losing normal functioning. Paxos and Raft assume 
that all nodes have already been checked and known, and 
that they are not characterized by malicious behavior. 
Therefore, they do not provide protection against Byzan-
tine faults, but only from a temporary crash fault. Thus, 
the level of security they guarantee is significantly lower. 
Nodes do not know each other in permissionless block-
chains, so there is no basis for trust. With permissioned 
blockchains, the nodes do not have to know each other ei-
ther, but the very fact that the membership is permissioned 
gives some degree of trust. Thus, with pBFT, mutual trust 
is based on the fact that the nodes have been allowed to 
enter the system. That is why each node communicates 
with all other nodes, because it trusts their decisions. 
With dBFT and FBA, the situation is somewhat different, 
so the nodes choose who they trust. This is especially 
pronounced with FBA and the so-called flexible trust, 
meaning that, regardless of the total number of nodes, the 
participants make a decision only with those who they 
trust. With PoA, trust is based on a previously irrevocably 
established identity and the responsibility it entails. With 
the Paxos and Raft protocols, nodes have complete mutual 
trust in terms of goodwill, but they do not trust each other 
in terms of prompt response to tasks.
One of the key problems of permissionless blockchains 
is that, due to protocol design in a trustless environment, 
they cannot achieve throughput at the level of payment 
card companies. In order for a single protocol to be con-
sidered an adequate basis for a financial or other business 
system, it must allow the processing of a large number 
of transactions. All protocols analyzed in this paper 
show significantly high throughput, but there are differ-
ences between them. Thus, with pBFT, on a sample of 
10,000 transactions on the Hyperledger Fabric platform, 
a throughput of about 200 transactions per second (TPS) 
was proven [25]. dBFT is said to be able to support around 
4000 TPS [26], though specific data on the NEO cryptocur-
rency blockchain shows that this number is 4 times lower. 
Also, the data shows throughput of about 4000 TPS with 
FBA [27], though theoretical assumptions claim that this 
number could be over 10,000. PoA has a slightly lower 
throughput, of about 80 TPS. 
There are large differences in terms of scalability of the 
observed protocols. It was shown that a pBFT network 
with 40 nodes takes only 4 seconds to confirm a block of 
10,000 transactions, but that with an increase in the num-
ber of nodes to 200, than time increases to 26 seconds and 
continues to grow exponentially [28]. From the above it can 
be concluded that pBFT is a good solution for small and 
controlled systems, but that due to the need for all nodes 
to communicate with each other it is not a good choice for 
large systems. It was stated that the NEO blockchain can 
process a block within 20 seconds, when the number of 
nodes ranges from 7 to 1024 [26]. Thus, with the growth of 
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the system, dBFT becomes a better choice than pBFT, but 
it also has scalability limits. FBA is designed to maintain 
high scalability despite the involvement of thousands of 
nodes. However, this has not been confirmed in practice, 
because the Ripple and Stellar cryptocurrency blockchains 
have only 130 and 136 nodes, respectively. At the same 
time, they maintain a very stable scalability. PoA has a 
stable scalability which means 5-8 seconds required to 
validate the block even in case of increasing the number 
of nodes to over 1000. The problem that Paxos and Raft 
face in this context is the need for all communication to 
go through one node (leader), which leads to a bottleneck.
5. Conclusions
Comparing consensus protocol performance has three 
limitations. First of all, although all the observed proto-
cols are intended for permissioned blockchains, not all 
have the same purpose. The clearest clasification is into 
those protocols that protect the system from Byzantine 
faults and those that protect only from crash faults. How-
ever, there are differences within these groups as well. 
Thus, pBFT is intended for systems with a small number 
of nodes, while FBA is intended for systems with a large 
number of nodes. If performed outside the intended envi-
ronment, these systems can show significant deviations in 
terms of performance. Comparison under conditions that 
favor one group or one separate protocol yields results 
that do not reflect their actual usability.
Furthermore, observed protocols were not tested evenly 
in practice. It is worth mentioning that dBFT and PoA ac-
tually have limited application, and that their performance 
should therefore not be taken as completely reliable. Some 
protocols can be analyzed in parallel on the examples of 
a larger number of cryptocurrencies and/or business plat-
forms, while others have an application that is sufficient 
only for conditional results. Finally, most protocols in 
practice show deviations from the theoretically stated op-
timal results. This problem is related to the previous one 
and speaks of insufficient testing in different conditions 
and on different platforms.
Having in mind the above and the results of the com-
parison, it can be concluded that no protocol shows ab-
solute dominance in all aspects of the comparison. When 
choosing a consensus protocol for a blockchain applica-
tion, one should take into account priority characteristics.
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